Using evidence from the European Community Household Panel we find that family benefits are of varying importance to household incomes and in the prevention of child poverty across Europe. In one group of countries family benefits appear to have a significant effect on the protection of children from financial poverty. The UK and the Netherlands are both members of this group, and we use the microsimulation model EUROMOD to examine the extent to which differences in child benefits explain the very different level of child poverty in the two countries. We also explore the effect of "swapping" child benefit systems between the two countries and find that there is some scope for improvements in looking beyond national borders. We conclude that the poverty reduction properties of universal child benefits may be improved without resorting to means-testing or compromising the other functions of these benefits. This analysis illustrates that comparative microsimulations can be extremely informative, and provides a flavour of the potential of EUROMOD to offer valuable pointers for the direction of social policies.
be seen as having many functions in addition to reducing the rate of child poverty (Brown, 1988) . For example, it performs a similar role to child tax allowances in contributing to horizontal equity in the net taxation of families of different types; it helps secure some degree of lifetime re-distribution by enhancing family incomes during a period of additional need; it promotes positive incentives to work (if it is not income-or work-tested); if it is paid to the mother it redistributes resources towards mothers (which is likely to improve the welfare of their children -see Goode et al. (1998) and Lundberg et al. (1997) ).
In general, a particular design of benefit will reflect the balance of priorities given to each objective. A benefit that is means-tested can be seen as prioritising short-term income maintenance with a lesser regard for the possible adverse consequences of this form of targeting. These include negative effects on work incentives; a reduction in horizontal equity at higher income levels; inequities introduced due to the stigma associated with meanstesting; and the "unfairness" of high effective marginal tax rates (see Atkinson, 1998) . In this paper we consider the poverty reduction properties of child benefits at the same time as recognising their other functions. Thus we choose not to explore poverty reduction through policy measures that rely on targeting by income (ie by means-testing) but instead seek other ways of using cash benefits to target children living on low incomes. 2 We consider the children of the European Union. They are of interest as a single group for two reasons. First, although social policy co-ordination in Europe has not yet reached the stage of common benefits across countries, comparisons with other EU countries are a major influence on national policy development. Furthermore, convergence of macroeconomic policy and the constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 do have effects research assistance and Cathal O'Donoghue for modelling support, advice and comments. The authors alone are responsible for any errors, as well as the views presented in this paper.
at the micro-level on the living standards and incomes of families with children (Atkinson, 1998a) . These effects themselves are unlikely to be common across countries, not least because of varying national responses to the need for adjustments. However, the very combination of policy formulation at the European level with differential national response to its effects motivates the need for analysis at the European level.
The second reason is that, although by global standards the countries of Western Europe are rich, there remains considerable variation among them in average disposable income (see section 2). Drawing a single European poverty line -and the great dispersion in national poverty rates that this implies -helps to keep the very different absolute standards of income within our view.
3 Even so, we find that there are poor children in the richest countries, suggesting that child poverty is an issue that is rightly considered in European as well as national terms with, perhaps, scope for a co-ordinated European solution.
Section 2 establishes the scale of the problem by using household micro-data for 15 countries to count the proportion of children living in households with incomes below a European poverty line. Section 3 makes an initial attempt to assess the role of existing family benefits in preventing child poverty. This analysis is based on a simple calculation using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) of the effect on household incomes of the removal of family benefits. The limitations of this approach are spelled out in section 4, and section 5 describes a Europe-wide microsimulation model, EUROMOD, built specifically to overcome these problems. In section 6 we present preliminary results from EUROMOD for two countries -the Netherlands and the UK -to illustrate the capabilities of EUROMOD. We examine the impacts of national child benefits on the national income distributions and 2 Jarvis (1995) considers these issues in depth for the case of Hungary.
estimates of poverty, and explore the effects of introducing each national system into the other country.
In exploring the potential for child benefits to reduce child poverty rates we set ourselves an illustrative objective that is drawn from current UK Government policy. The target set by the British Prime Minister for the UK for the 3-year period between March 1999 and the end of the current parliament (April 2002 at the latest) is a reduction of 18% in child poverty rates corresponding to an absolute reduction in child poverty rates of 6%.
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Neither the UK Government nor any other policy-maker would seek to tackle child poverty using a single instrument such as a cash benefit. Clearly long term and sustainable solutions also lie in policy measures that relate to the labour market, patterns of fertility and partnership, the availability of formal or informal childcare and of other non-cash support and subsidy. Indeed, the UK Treasury has estimated that measures already taken will be sufficient to meet the poverty target. 5 Furthermore, we recognise that the financial poverty of parents is just one factor that influences the current or future risk of social exclusion among children, or which acts to diminish their well-being in more general terms. However, the intention of this paper is to explore the potential of child benefit as means of reducing (financial) poverty among children.
A European poverty line and children in European poverty
3 See Atkinson (1998) for a discussion of the choice between national or European poverty standards (pages 27-29). 4 Tony Blair, Beveridge Lecture 18 th March 1999, Toynbee Hall, London. See www.number-10.gov.uk/public/info/index.html The lecture states that one third of children are in households with below half mean incomes and that 20% of the UK population is children. (The UK population is approximately 57.5 million.) The target reduction in poor children is 700,000. This amounts to 6% of all children or 18% of children who are currently poor, using the half-mean standard. 5 See Piachaud (1999).
As a first step, we seek to establish the incidence of financial poverty among European children under prevailing social policies. There are many approaches to this task. Here, since we focus on Europe as a whole, we draw a European poverty line. For illustrative purposes, we confine ourselves to a particular set of assumptions and one data source for each country.
The micro-data we use for all countries except Finland and Sweden are drawn from the second wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), using the User Data Base (UDB) for Wave 2. Micro-data for Finland and Sweden are drawn from the respective national income distribution statistics, which are based on a combination of register and survey data. We calculate the numbers of people and numbers of children living in households with equivalised income below proportions of the EU15 mean. In doing this we implicitly assume that if household income falls below the poverty line then all the individuals within the household are poor to the same extent.
Our choice of the mean as the central measure of income (rather than the median, which is now favoured by Eurostat) is designed to minimise the effort involved in integrating information for Finland and Sweden. 6 Household incomes are measured after taxes and benefits, on an annual basis for 1994 and are converted to the common currency using 1994
PPP-adjusted exchange rates. They are equivalised using the modified OECD scale. In calculating the means and performing the headcount calculations, each household is weighted by the number of people in it. The EU15 mean is calculated by weighting the national means by the national population and dividing by the EU15 population. For more information see Immervoll et al. (1999) . The EU15 mean is 12102 PPP-adjusted ecu per equivalent person per 6 We are very grateful to the EUROMOD project participants from Finland (Esko Mustonen and Heikki Viitamäki) and Sweden (Bengt Eklind) for taking part in the two-stage process to include their countries in the calculations. First, they provided estimates of mean income and population for their countries. In the second stage they calculated the numbers in Finland and Sweden below the EU15 poverty line. Note that the equivalent procedure to integrate Swedish and Finnish headcounts based on median incomes would have been much more elaborate.
year. National means as proportions of the EU15 mean shown in Table 1 range from 0.6 (Portugal) to 1.8 (Luxembourg). 7 This variation is similar to that shown for European countries by other indicators of aggregate income, such as GDP per capita (Eurostat, 1996;  table B2). One would not expect the two measures to produce exactly the same picture, since the effective equivalence scale and the income concept are both different. However, the ranking of some countries using 1994 GDP per capita (shown in the last column of Table 1 ) is quite different to that for mean equivalised income using ECHP data in the first column of Table 1 . In particular, Italy appears much higher (ranked 8 instead of 12), Austria is higher (3 instead of 5) and Germany and the UK are lower (5 and 9 instead of 3 and 7, respectively).
This comparison may raise the issue of the quality of the ECHP data, particularly for Italy, or at least throw into question the precise income concept that is being measured. However, it is not our purpose here to provide definitive estimates of child poverty using these data. Rather, it is to illustrate the type of analyses that are possible with the direct use of household survey micro-data. We explore the extent to which they can answer our questions about the role of child benefits in preventing child poverty. comparability reasons we adopt this narrow definition. 8 We can make the following observations:
• There is great variation in headcount ratios across countries, due not only to differences in within-country inequality but also to differences in between-country mean incomes.
Focusing on all ages and the 50% cut-off, we can see that five countries have proportions that are very low: less than half of the all-EU figure of 18% (Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden). A further five countries have proportions lower than the EU average (France, Belgium, Austria, Germany and the UK). The remaining five vary from 50% larger than the all-EU figure (Italy and Ireland), to double the EU figure (Spain and Greece), with the highest proportion (47% of the population) in
Portugal.
• At the European level the headcount ratios are consistently somewhat higher for children than for the population as a whole: children are more likely than adults to live in poor households.
• Comparing across countries we see that this is not uniformly the case. In some countries children are less likely to be poor. This is particularly the case in Denmark and Luxembourg but also so in Sweden, and to some extent in Finland, Greece and France. On the other hand, children in the UK and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy are more likely than adults to be poor. It is possible that these observations are due to the use of the (modified) OECD equivalence scale, which differentiates between the relative needs of younger children (those aged under 14) and others. However, the use of an alternative scale that does not take account of age (square root of household size) 8 It remains the case that the definition of a dependent child is an important issue for social policy and for its evaluation. There are large differences across European countries in circumstances in which and the extent to which older children may be treated as dependent on their parents. For example, people aged up to 30 may be treated as children in Spain, but with the exception of disabled dependants, all people aged 19 and over are considered independent of their parents in the UK. See Millar and Warman (1996) and O'Donoghue and Sutherland (1998; Appendix 2), for more information.
produces an identical pattern of countries with lower and higher chances of child poverty relative to adult poverty.
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• There is not a great difference in the headcount ratios for children aged under 14 and those up to 16. Although in the UK and Sweden older children appear to have a slightly lower risk of poverty, on average -and in most countries -the opposite is true. However, this observation does seem to be simply a consequence of our choice of the OECD equivalence scale. Using an age-neutral equivalence scale reduces the average difference in poverty rates for the two age ranges to zero.
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The role of "family-related benefits"
We now explore the extent to which explanations for differences across countries in headcount ratios for children (and in the relative ratios for children compared to adults) lie in international differences in family benefits.
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In this section we examine the evidence available in the ECHP for 12 countries. The ECHP UDB provides a variable "family-related benefits" which, as well as child benefits includes maternity benefits and benefits for carers of disabled dependants. 12 Table 2 shows the proportion of all household disposable income that is made up by these allowances (for all households). It varies from 6.6% in Belgium to 0.2% in Spain. In order to investigate its importance to households with children below the European poverty line, we carry out a rudimentary simulation. We set the value of family-related allowances to zero and re-count the number of children who are in households below the poverty lines. For simplicity, we do 9 These calculations were done only for countries for which we have ECHP data: not Finland and Sweden. 10 Calculated for the countries for which we have ECHP data. 11 Previous studies include Ditch et al. (1996) who use Luxembourg Income Study data to estimate the impact of the whole direct tax and benefit system in nine countries of the EU on national poverty rates for families of different types. 12 ECHP UDB variable HI133. This variable is not available for Germany.
not re-calculate the mean but leave it fixed at 12102 Ecu per year per equivalent adult (see Table 1 ). Implicitly, we assume no behavioural adjustments (such as changes in wages or working hours) following this reduction in benefit income. Table 2 reports, for children aged under 16 and for each of the three poverty lines, the new headcount ratio (labelled "without CB"). It also shows the absolute (percentage point) increase in child poverty and the percentage increase in the proportion of poor children. The "European" (EU12) rate of child poverty increases by between 6 and 7 percentage points, depending on the choice of poverty line. We can identify three groups of countries:
1. Denmark and Luxembourg: 13 child poverty rates are relatively low, with or without family-related benefits. Although the benefits are relatively generous, removing them causes poverty rates to rise by a small absolute amount. However, the percentage increase in poor children is very large.
2. Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal (and Ireland, except at the 40% line): child poverty rates start high but are little affected by the removal of benefits. This is because, with the exception of Ireland, the size of the benefits is small, combined with the fact that the European poverty lines are high in relation to the incomes of households with children in these countries. Benefits would have to be very large to have a significant effect on poverty measured in this way.
3. UK, Belgium, Austria, France, the Netherlands (and Ireland at the 40% line): 14 familyrelated benefits are relatively large in size and are also relatively successful at protecting children from poverty. On removing the benefits, poverty rates rise significantly both in absolute and proportional terms. 13 It is likely that Sweden and Finland also belong to this group. 14 It is likely that Germany also belongs to this group.
Clearly, family benefits have a major role to play in child poverty prevention in Europe. Here, we consider ways in which this role might be improved for each of these groups. In group 1 incomes are already relatively high, meaning that only a minority of children are below the European poverty line. However, it remains the case that children in the poorest households in these countries are well-protected by family benefits. For example, in Denmark, the child poverty rate (using the 60% cut-off) would rise from 4.9% to 12.7% if family benefits were removed. Children in both countries are already less likely than the population as a whole to be poor. In these countries it would be interesting to explore ways in which benefits for children could be designed to raise the incomes of the small minority who are poor by European standards (3.1% of Danish children and 2.5% of children from Luxembourg using the 50% cut-off).
In group 2 countries, relatively low average incomes mean that the generally low benefits cannot bring households with children up to even the lowest European poverty line. In these cases it would be interesting to explore the effects of more substantial child benefits on child poverty rates. Need a new benefit be large and expensive to reduce the numbers of children in poverty, or could benefits of modest cost be designed to particularly target on groups vulnerable to poverty?
The third group consists of countries that appear to have family benefits that are relatively successful at reducing child poverty. However, in all these countries, child poverty rates are higher than for the population as a whole (using the 50% line). Are there improvements in the design of benefits that could assist in the rather modest target of making child poverty rates no higher than the rates for the whole population? Are there features of particular national systems that other countries could learn from? We note from Table 1 that the six countries in this group (including Germany) have relatively similar PPP-adjusted mean incomes. With the exception of the UK they also have relatively similar child poverty rates (using the 50% and 60% cut-offs). The UK has a much higher rate (22% compared with between 9% and 14% for the other countries, using the 50% cut-off). This is significantly higher than the rate for the UK population as a whole. Can this be explained by inadequacies in the system of UK family benefits? Are there other types of benefit that would reduce the UK's contribution to the European rate of child poverty?
The role of policy simulation
The figures shown in Table 2 have some important limitations in terms of their ability to provide answers to the issues raised in the previous section.
First, we need to be clear about the policy instruments on which we wish to focus. If we wished to consider all types of income maintenance policy that might keep children out of poverty, we would cast our net wider than "family benefits". We would wish to include in our analysis tax allowances and credits and other tax concessions benefiting families with children. 15 We might wish to include social assistance, in-work benefits and housing benefits where these include specific components for children. We might also wish to include sources of income in kind targeted on children, that are part of some social protection systems (such as free school meals or subsidised day care). 16 However, this paper is about the role of child benefits, rather than family benefits in general. With this narrow focus, we need to be able to distinguish child benefits from the wider category of benefits for which information is available in the ECHP.
Even with the narrow focus that we have chosen, there are many parameters of the system to consider. Child benefits may not only be of different magnitudes, they can also vary in many other respects. The benefits may be taxable or non-taxable, income-or wealth-tested or universal, contributory or non-contributory. They may vary by the age or parity of the child, or be the same value for all children. The definition of an eligible child (or parent) may also vary. To explore how well the benefits perform -from the perspective of poverty reduction or any other function we consider to be important -we need to be able to focus on particular aspects of their design.
Clearly the nature of cash benefits is not the only factor that determines whether children are more likely to be poor than adults. Other crucial factors include the nature of the labour market, patterns of fertility and partnership, and the availability of non-cash support systems such as formal or informal childcare. The existence of child benefits of various types may play an anti-poverty role in the short term by simply raising the incomes of households with children. At the same time, they may have a longer term effect through their impact on labour market incentives. To separate the pure short term policy effects from the longer term, and from underlying differences in patterns of working and household formation we can ask "what if" questions using policy simulation. role. In practice, in these cases, poverty would not increase to the extent shown in Table 2 . In these countries the operation of child benefits is difficult to separate from the benefit system as a whole. Furthermore, in some countries some child benefits or other family benefits are taxable. Removing the benefits would decrease tax liability. This effect is also not captured in the illustrative calculations in Table 2 .
Household micro-data such as those provided by single waves from the ECHP give us a representation of the outcomes of existing policy at one point in time. Following the same people through several waves of the ECHP (or other panel data sources) allows us to explore the evolution of behaviour and incomes as social and fiscal policy as well as the macro environment change. It is difficult to distinguish the direct effects of changes in tax and benefit policy from all the other influences on income. In order to isolate the impact of a particular policy, to focus on detailed aspects of policy design, or to explore the implications for micro-level incomes of specific policy changes, a microsimulation model is required.
Static microsimulation (or "tax-benefit") models allow us to hold constant many variables so that we can focus on the aspects of interest. Specifically, they allow us to separate the direct effects of tax and social security policy on incomes from all the underlying influences on income and from the other characteristics of the population. So we can "borrow" policy -or parts of it -from one country and apply it to another country's population. O'Donoghue and Sutherland (1998) do this by applying stylised versions of European systems of the taxation of couples to the UK population; Atkinson et al. (1988) apply the British tax system to the French population; De Lathouwer (1996) compares unemployment schemes for Belgium and the Netherlands using data on the Belgian population.
Tax-benefit models are based on household micro-data and so capture the full range of variation of family circumstance without needing to define what is "typical" or "representative".
They calculate household disposable income for each household. This calculation is made up of elements of gross income taken from the survey data combined with elements of incometaxes and benefits -that are simulated by the model. The calculations are performed twice (or more), once for the current (or some other default) system, and again for each policy change, specified by the user. The first round effect of the change is the arithmetic difference in the "before" and "after" calculations.
The model code replicates the most important features of the tax and social security law as it exists. Parameterisation of as much as possible of the code allows the user to specify policy changes in terms of alterations to parameters describing the existing system. Changes in structure may also be coded and choices between alternative structures selected using parameter switches. Thus tax-benefit models offer distinct "levers to pull" and "buttons to push" so that simulated changes translate directly into changes to actual policy rules that governments can make. When policy is in transition -and in particular when changes are being phased in by treating "new" cases differently to "old" cases -users of simulation models are able to choose whether to model the old system for all cases, the new system for all cases, or the mixture as it exists at any point in time. (Of course, they can also be used to analyse the effects for all cases of moving from the old to the new system.) In addition, choices may be made about the date at which the simulation is to take place and about global behavioural effects such as tax evasion or non-take-up of benefits.
Outputs of the models include aggregate revenue effects (with the micro-data weighted to population level) and distributional effects with changes categorised by income level or other characteristics.
Such static microsimulation models exist in most countries of the EU and the rest of the OECD. 17 However, to explore the effects of benefits in a comparable manner in different countries as well as on European child poverty, we need a model that operates at the European level. This is the subject of the next section.
EUROMOD and policy simulation at the European level
EUROMOD is an integrated European tax-benefit model, which, at the time of writing is under construction. EUROMOD provides us with a Europe-wide perspective on social and fiscal policies that are implemented at European, national or regional level. It is also designed to examine, within a consistent comparative framework, the impact of national policies on national populations or the differential impact of co-ordinated European policy on individual Member
States. See Immervoll et al. (1999) Given the limitations of the underlying data, not all the relevant components of the respective tax-benefit system lend themselves to simulation. We simulate income taxes, social insurance contributions, child benefits and other family benefits, and income-tested benefits. In computing income, components that are not simulated in the model are taken directly from the data (i.e. it is assumed that they are unaffected by the policy reform). In particular, this is the case for contribution based payments, such as unemployment benefits or contributory pensions. In this preliminary version of EUROMOD it is also the case for housing benefits (in both countries) and council tax benefit (in the UK). 20 The specific instruments that have been simulated/not simulated are listed in Appendix 1.
In comparing results across countries (and for simulating the effects of introducing one country's instrument in the other country), monetary amounts have been converted using Purchasing Power Parities.
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Household incomes have been equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale. In this exercise we use national poverty lines defined as 60% of equivalised median household disposable income, with each household weighted by its size. In exploring the effects of policy changes on the incomes of households with children, we use two alternative definitions of a child. The first is all people aged less than 14 (as in the OECD equivalence scale). The second is the definition of a child used in UK policy: all people aged below 16, plus those aged below 19 who are in full-time secondary education, not married and not a parent themselves. Table 3 shows the poverty lines for the two countries, based on 1998 policy simulated for the 1995 (UK) or 1996 (Netherlands) populations with updated incomes. It also shows the percentages of all people and of children (under both definitions) who are living in households with equivalised incomes below the national lines. We see that the poverty among children in the UK is higher if one adopts the OECD child definition (age<14) as opposed to the one used in the UK tax-benefit system (includes many 14-18 year olds), indicating that child poverty is more concentrated among younger children. The opposite is true for the Netherlands. This is also confirmed by figures 1a and 1b, showing the position of children in the national income distributions in the two countries. In the UK, the percentage of "OECD" children in the three lowest income groups is clearly higher than that of "UK" children. In the UK, the number of children generally decreases with increasing income (with the notable exception of the second decile). In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the highest numbers of children are found in the middle of the distribution.
A case study: child benefits in the Netherlands and the UK
The ECHP evidence described in section 3 suggests that family benefits are relatively important to household incomes in both the UK and the Netherlands. They also appear to play a major role in protecting children from poverty in both countries. Evidence from 21 We carried the 1995 household sector PPP forward to June 1998 using the changes in the Harmonised Consumer Price Index of both countries (the resulting 1998 PPP exchange rate is 3.0514 NFL/GBP). The 1995 administrative statistics suggests that child benefit itself is a similar proportion of GDP in both countries. In the UK in 1996/7 child benefit was 0.88% of GDP and 7.2% of all government spending on social security benefits. 22 In the Netherlands child benefits amounted to 0.90% of GDP in 1997, or 5% of total benefit payments. 23 However, a major difference between the two countries is the extent of child poverty. ECHP evidence for 1994 in Table 1 indicates that 9% of children in the Netherlands and 22% in the UK are poor, using the 50% cut-off and children aged under 16. EUROMOD estimates for 1998 using national poverty lines, shown in Table 3 are 14% and 28% using the UK definition of children. Another significant difference is the relatively higher rates for children than adults in the UK, whereas the rates are similar in the Netherlands.
The 1998 systems of child benefit and child support in the Netherlands and the UK were structurally similar in some respects and different in others. Appendix 2 provides the details, which are summarised below.
Similarities
• Child benefit is not income-or wealth-tested
• Child benefit is non-contributory and not work-tested
• No income tax or contributions are payable on child benefit
• No child-related income tax allowances/credits, except for lone parents
Differences
PPP was taken from Eurostat (1999: p. 36 • Definition of a child is slightly different. It it includes most 16-17 year-olds in the Netherlands (subject to a children's income limit, and employment and education status and disability conditions). In the UK it excludes a more extensive group of 16-17 yearolds but includes some 18-year olds.
• Child benefit payments vary by age in the Netherlands, not in the UK
• Child benefit payments increase with parity in the old Netherlands system, which is in the process of phased change. There is no variation with parity in the new system. In the UK system, the benefit decreases (slightly) in value with parity (the amount for the first child is 23% more than for other children).
• Small additions to child benefit for lone parents in the UK (these are in the process of being phased out); no lone parent additions in the Netherlands.
• Child benefit is not included as income in the assessment of income for social assistance in the Netherlands; no specific additions to social assistance rates (except to lone parents and young parents). In the UK, child benefit is included in social assistance income assessments and there are specific child additions to social assistance payments.
There are other significant differences between the systems of cash child support for lowincome families in the two countries -notably the in-work benefit for parents on low earnings, family credit, in the UK. However, we maintain our focus on the role of child benefit and evaluate a series of scenarios with the aim of exploring the impact of the national systems of child benefit. In each country we first abolish the existing child benefit. The motivation here is not to evaluate this scenario as a realistic reform option. Rather, by comparing the existing scenario with one where no child benefits are available, it is possible to assess what difference the existing child benefit makes in terms of incomes. We then "swap systems" and explore the effect of the UK system in the Netherlands and vice versa. However, three factors complicate the exercise. First, both countries operate additional instruments targeted on lone parents. For reasons of clarity we hold these constant and do not explore changes to them.
Secondly, child benefit is integrated differently into the two systems. In the Netherlands, it is not included in income assessments for social assistance (Income Support). In the UK, it is.
Therefore we carry out two versions of "abolition" for the UK. In the first, child benefit is abolished but Income Support is allowed to rise to take its place. In the second, Income
Support child payments are reduced by the value as child benefit so that we can evaluate the effect of the universal child payment on all households with children.
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The third complication is that policy in both countries is in a transitional phase. In the Netherlands the 1998 scheme is part way between an "old" scheme where child benefit payments depended on the age and number of children and a "new" scheme that is being phased in that depends on age only. 25 In the UK lone parent benefits are not paid to new lone parents (or new claimants), but are retained for "old" claimants. See Appendix 2 for more details of these transitions in both countries. Our baseline 1998 scenario for the UK assumes that all lone parents are "old". For the Netherlands, the baseline is the actual 1998 hybrid system, but we explore the effects of moving to both the "old" and the "new" system in two scenarios. We simulate 5 scenarios for the Netherlands and 4 for the UK, as follows:
Scenarios simulated for the Netherlands NL1 -Base-line scenario ("NL 1998") : System of rules current as of June 30, 1998.
NL2 -Abolish child benefit ("NL noCB"):
Same as "NL 1998" but child benefit amounts reduced to zero. 2424 Family Credit entitlements are unaffected by our simulated changes to child benefit because child benefit is not included in the Family Credit income assessment.
NL3 -New child benefit ("NL newCB"):
The current (June 1998) child benefit is replaced by the "new" rules in which the benefit depends only on the age of children, not their parity.
NL4 -Old child benefit ("NL oldCB"):
The current (June 1998) child benefit is replaced by the "old" rules which are more strongly dependent on parity.
NL5 -UK child benefit ("NL UKCB):
The current (June 1998) child benefit is replaced by the current UK child benefit. We adopt the UK rules with respect to both the child benefit amounts (except for the UK lone parent additional amount) and eligibility conditions (the child definition). Child benefit is not counted as "means" for social assistance. Using PPP exchange rates the child-benefit for one child aged 5 would rise from 314.66 NFL per quarter to 454.90 NFL per quarter. For a family with three children all aged between 6 and 9 it would fall from 1372.86 NFL to 1193.86 NFL.
Scenarios simulated for the UK:
UK1 -Base-line scenario ("UK 1998") : System of rules current as of June 30, 1998. All lone parents receive lone parent benefits.
UK2 -Abolish child benefit ("UK noCB1"):
Same as "UK 1998" but child benefit amounts are set to zero (the additional amount for lone parents is left unchanged).
UK3 -Abolish child benefit and reduce Income Support accordingly ("UK noCB2"): Same as
"UK noCB1" but the child related Income Support amounts are also reduced accordingly.
UK4 -Netherlands child benefit ("UK NLCB"):
Same as "UK 1998", except child benefit is replaced by the "old" Netherlands child benefit. We adopt the Dutch rules with respect to both the child benefit amounts and eligibility conditions (the child definition). The UK lone parent amounts are left unchanged. Child benefit is not included in the means test for Income Support. Using PPP exchange rates the child-benefit for one child aged 5 would fall from 25 It will apply to all children by the year 2011.
£11.45 per week to £7.92 per week. For a family of three children all aged between 6 and 9 it would rise from £30.05 to £34.56. Table 4 shows the monthly cost of each of the scenarios in national currency. In the Netherlands, the new system is significantly less generous than the old, with the actual 1998 system coming in between. The UK structure of child benefit is slightly less generous than the corresponding 1998 Netherlands system but more generous than the new system that is being phased in. In the UK more than a quarter of the cost of child benefit for all children is made up of payments to families in receipt of Income Support. In the UK, the Netherlands system is very much more generous than the existing UK system, costing 30 per cent more. Table 5 shows the effect of moving from the baseline scenario to the alternatives in terms of the percentage change in household income across the national (all household) distributions of income. 26 These distributional effects are illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b . The effects of the "noCB" scenarios illustrate the importance of child benefits to family incomes, particularly at the bottom but also in the middle of the distributions in both countries. For the UK the difference between the "noCB1" and "noCB2" scenarios shows the extent of dependence on
Results
Income Support by families with children in the bottom half of the distribution. Comparing the distributional effects of the 1998 system and the old and new systems in the Netherlands shows that the current system is part-way between the old and the new in its distributional effect as well as its cost. For the Netherlands, the UK system of child benefit involves a similar, although smaller, negative effect on incomes to the new Netherlands system. In the UK, however, the introduction of the old Netherlands system would bring significant 26 In these distributions, households are counted once and are not weighted by household size.
percentage increases in income, particularly to the bottom quintile. It is important to note, however, that not everybody would gain from the introduction of the "old" Netherlands child benefit in the UK. Figure 2d shows the number of persons and children gaining (positive values) and losing (negative values) as a result of the reform. As mentioned before, families that are less well off under the "old" Netherlands child benefit include those with only one child. In addition, some 18 year olds are still eligible under the UK system, while in the Netherlands nobody over 17 counts as a child (see Appendix 2 for a detailed overview of applicable amounts and definitions). However, even though a considerable number of persons is worse off after the reform, those gaining from switching to the Netherlands benefit would clearly outnumber the losers. If one were to introduce the UK child benefit in the Netherlands, the number of gainers and losers would be much more balanced (Figure 2c ).
We now turn to the effect of the alternative scenarios on estimates of poverty. We have drawn the poverty lines using the baseline scenarios -the existing 1998 systems. In Table 6 we show the extent to which each of the scenarios, including the existing systems, reduce poverty headcounts for all persons and for children (using both definitions). The first and third panels of the table show the percentage reduction in the poverty rates for the Netherlands and the UK respectively. The relative sizes of the reductions, unsurprisingly, are related directly to the generosity of the respective schemes (see Table 4 ). The most expensive scheme in either country is the "old" Netherlands scheme and this is also the most effective in reducing poverty (and child poverty). The second and fourth panels control for the cost of the scheme and show the effects in terms of the absolute reduction in headcounts per unit spending on benefit -we use this measure as an indicator for the "efficiency" in terms of poverty reduction. For the Netherlands we find that although the old scheme is the most efficient at reducing poverty, the UK system is more efficient (as well as cheaper) than the existing Netherlands system. The least efficient system for the Netherlands is the "new" system: the one that is currently being phased in.
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For the UK, the "old" Netherlands system is very clearly more efficient in terms of poverty reduction than the current UK child benefit. Thirteen percent more people (and 18% more children, using the UK definition) would be removed from poverty per unit of spending under the Netherlands system, than under the current UK structure of child benefit.
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In order to compare the results for the Netherlands and the UK, Table 7 shows the "efficiency" estimates for the two countries using the same unit of currency. Here, we find a rather striking result. As well as the old Netherlands system being more efficient than the UK system in the UK, it is (slightly) more efficient than it is in the Netherlands. The reverse is also true. The UK system is more efficient in the Netherlands than it is in the UK.
An alternative perspective is provided in Figures 3a and 3b which show the percentage point changes in poverty rates for children (UK definition) for each alternative scheme, compared with the actual 1998 system in each country. In the Netherlands, we see that child poverty rates would increase by 7.2 percentage points (to 20.1% -see Table 3 ) if child benefit were removed. The changes in the structure of the child benefit, which are currently underway, have a relatively small impact, although the old system is shown as having the effect of reducing child poverty by 1 percentage point. 27 It is worth mentioning that these measures of poverty reduction could be quite sensitive to the concept of "need" implied by the equivalence scale used. In particular, our choice of the modified OECD equivalence scale for equivalising household income implies that "need" varies with age and number of persons living in the household. The performance of the different benefits in terms of poverty reduction could be quite different if one were to adopt alternative criteria for equivalising incomes of different types of households.
For the UK, child poverty rates would increase (in terms of percentage points) by an amount comparable to the Netherlands if child benefit were removed from all children (6.9%).
However, we also see a significant drop in the absolute level of poverty among children if the ("old") Netherlands system were introduced. Child poverty would be reduced by 3.7
percentage points (to 24.0% -see Table 3 ). Returning to the target set by the UK Government, mentioned in the introduction, the replacement of the current UK system by the "old"
Netherlands child benefit, with increases by age and parity, would move UK children more than halfway to the target for child poverty reduction (3.7% compared with the target 6%). 29 7
Concluding comments
We have seen that family benefits in general and child benefits in particular are of varying importance to household incomes and in the prevention of child poverty across Europe. In some countries, family benefits are generous but even without them incomes are sufficient to protect the large majority of children from poverty. In a second group, family benefits are relatively small and have little effect on poverty. In a third group, child benefits appear to have a significant effect on the protection of children from poverty. The UK and the Netherlands are both members of this third group and we have used microsimulation techniques to examine the extent to which differences in child benefits explain the very different level of child poverty in the two countries. We also have explored the effect of "swapping" child benefit systems between the two countries. We find the following:
• The Netherlands system is in transition. The "old" system, which depends on parity as well as the age of the child, is both more generous overall and more effective at reducing poverty than the "new" system, which depends on age alone.
• The "old" Netherlands system is also the most effective for child poverty reduction in the UK. Even when controlling for the amount spent on benefit, a system that pays more to older children and larger families appears to be more efficient in reducing poverty rates in both countries. This effect is particularly strong in the UK.
• Most crucially, we have focussed on child benefits (and reforms) that do not involve income-or means-testing. We have shown that the poverty reduction properties of universal child benefits may be improved without compromising the other functions of these benefits.
Clearly, there is scope to take this type of analysis further. It would be interesting to explore the effects of structurally-different schemes that cost the same within countries. Alternatively, the financing of more expensive schemes (through income tax or other means) could be incorporated into the simulations. Experiments with the variation of benefits by age and parity could be extended outside the scope of existing (or past or projected) policy. A common child benefit for the two countries could be designed, making use of what we now know about the relative effects of different schemes in the two countries.
We have used a case-study of just two countries with quite similar child benefit systems. An EU15 version of EUROMOD will allow us to compare countries with more diverse systems.
EUROMOD also offers us the possibility to carry out similar analyses for larger groups of countries and for the whole European Union. As discussed above, it will enable us to draw common European poverty lines, construct a common income distribution and generally to consider the European population across national boundaries. 30 However, it is clear that 29 Other methods of measuring poverty and changes in it could give different results. We do not know how the UK Government intends to monitor movements towards its target. 30 In the present paper we have refrained from exploring the effect of child benefits on EU2 (UK plus the Netherlands) children in poverty since this group would be dominated by children from the UK.
comparative microsimulations can also be extremely informative. Our example shows that seeking for improvements in policy design across national boundaries can be a quite fruitful exercise. Further work would be needed to draw firm conclusions about the beneficial effect of a parity-and age-related child benefit on child poverty in the UK. However, we believe that this preliminary output from EUROMOD is the first of many microsimulation exercises to provide valuable pointers for the direction of social policies. Eurostat (1996) Source: EUROMOD "allowance" is in fact a non-refundable credit, set at £1900 per year and allowed at a rate of 15% (ie it's maximum cash value is £285 per year (£23.75 pm). No other tax allowances for children or families in 1998.
Social assistance
There are additions to social assistance (Income Support) for each child, which depend on age.
There is also a family premium if there are any children and a lone parent premium which is additional to the family premium for lone parents. Again there is phasing out of the LP premium in the basis that new claimants (or new lone parents) do not get it.
There are single and couple rates and premia which depend on the age of the adults. Child benefit is taken into account in the income assessment for Income Support (IS). Thus if child benefit were reduced, IS entitlement would rise by the same amount.
The income assessment for IS is made on a family unit basis (parents -married or cohabiting -plus children), with some standard deductions from benefit if other adults in the household are assumed to be contributing income (eg "adult" children).
The structure is similar for housing benefit and council tax benefit (which we do not model in this exercise), although there are tapers so these income-related benefits do not replace child benefit £ for £.
Family credit (FC)
Families with children (same definition) where one parent works at least 16 hours per week may receive family credit. The "credit" (in fact, a cash benefit) is worked out taking account of work hours, net income of the family unit (nuclear family) and numbers and ages of children. Given these things, there is no differentiation between lone parent and 2-parent families.
There is a taper of 70% on family net income, after a minimum threshold. Unlike with IS, the income assessment does not take account of child benefit. However, the FC child rates are set, and the benefit as a whole is designed, on the assumption that the families receive child benefit as well (take-up of CB is virtually 100%). Child rates are (£/week) age 0-10 12.35 age 11-15 20.45 age 16-18 25.40 and are additional to the main rate that assumes that there is at least one child.
